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Abstract
Americans spend about a third of their
time online, with many participating in on-
line conversations on social and political
issues. We hypothesize that social media
arguments on such issues may be more en-
gaging and persuasive than traditional me-
dia summaries, and that particular types of
people may be more or less convinced by
particular styles of argument, e.g. emo-
tional arguments may resonate with some
personalities while factual arguments res-
onate with others. We report a set of exper-
iments testing at large scale how audience
variables interact with argument style to
affect the persuasiveness of an argument,
an under-researched topic within natural
language processing. We show that be-
lief change is affected by personality fac-
tors, with conscientious, open and agree-
able people being more convinced by emo-
tional arguments.
1 Introduction
Americans spend a third of their online time on
social media, with many participating in online
conversations about education, public policy, or
other social and political issues. Our hypothe-
sis is that online dialogs have important proper-
ties that may make them a useful resource for ed-
ucating the public about such issues. For exam-
ple, user-generated content might be more engag-
ing and persuasive than traditional media, due to
the prevalence of emotional language, social affil-
iation, conversational argument structure and au-
dience involvement. Moreover, particular types of
people may be more or less convinced by partic-
ular styles of argument, e.g. emotional arguments
may resonate with some personalities while fac-
tual arguments resonate with others.
Factual: Death Penalty
Q1: I’m sure there have been more repeat murder-
ers than innocent people put to death. As far as
the cost goes, is that really an issue? Execution
Room = $10,000. Stainless Steel Table = $2,000.
Leather Straps = $200. Lethal Injection Chemicals
= $5,000. Knowing this person will never possibly
be able to kill again = PRICELESS
R1: Actually the room, straps, and table are all multi-
use. And the drugs only cost Texas $86.08 per ex-
ecution as of 2002.
Emotional: Death Penalty
Q2: You mean, the perpetrator is convicted and the
defender acquitted? Yes, that’s the rule and not
the exception. Notice here how no-one ended up
dead, or even particularly seriously injured. Addi-
tionally the circumstances described are incredibly
rare, that’s why it makes the news.
R2: The defender shouldn’t even have been brought to
trial in the first place. That doesn’t make it any bet-
ter. Somebody breaks into your home and threat-
ens your family with rape and murder, they de-
serve serious injury at the very least.
Table 1: Factual vs. Emotional dialog exchanges
4forums.com. Q = Quote, R = Response.
For example, contrast the two informal dialogic
exchanges about the death penalty in Table 1 with
the traditional media professional summary in Ta-
ble 2. We might expect the argument in Table 2 to
be more convincing, because it is carefully written
to be balanced and exhaustive (Reed and Rowe,
2004). On the other hand, it seems possible that
people find dialogic arguments such as those in
Table 1 more engaging and learn more from them.
And indeed, about 90% of the people in online fo-
rums are so-called lurkers (Whittaker, 1996; Non-
necke and Preece, 2000; Preece et al., 2004), and
do not post, suggesting that they are in fact read-
ing opinionated dialogs such as those in Table 1
for interest or entertainment.
Research in social psychology identifies three
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Curated Summary: Death Penalty
PRO: Proponents of the death penalty say it is an im-
portant tool for preserving law and order, deters
crime, and costs less than life imprisonment. They
argue that retribution or ”an eye for an eye” honors
the victim, helps console grieving families, and en-
sures that the perpetrators of heinous crimes never
have an opportunity to cause future tragedy.
CON: Opponents of capital punishment say it has no
deterrent effect on crime, wrongly gives govern-
ments the power to take human life, and perpetu-
ates social injustices by disproportionately target-
ing people of color (racist) and people who cannot
afford good attorneys (classist). They say lifetime
jail sentences are a more severe and less expensive
punishment than death.
Table 2: Traditional balanced summary of the
death penalty issue from ProCon.org.
factors that affect argument persuasiveness (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Cacioppo, 1988).
• the ARGUMENT itself
• the AUDIENCE
• the SOURCE of the argument
The ARGUMENT includes the content and its
presentation, e.g. whether it is a monolog or a
dialog, or whether it is factual or emotional as il-
lustrated in Table 1 and Table 2. The AUDIENCE
factor models people’s prior beliefs and social af-
filiations as well as innate individual differences
that affect their susceptibility to particular argu-
ments or types of arguments (Anderson, 1971;
Davies, 1998; Devine et al., 2000; Petty et al.,
1981). Behavioral economics research shows that
the cognitive style of the audience interacts with
the argument’s emotional appeal: emphasizing
personal losses is more persuasive for neurotics,
whereas gains are effective for extraverts (Carver
et al., 2000; Mann et al., 2004). The SOURCE is
the speaker, whose influence may depend on fac-
tors such as attractiveness, expertise, trustworthi-
ness or group identification or homophily (Eagly
and Chaiken, 1975; Kelman, 1961; Bender et al.,
2011; Luchok and McCroskey, 1978; Ludford et
al., 2004; McPherson et al., 2001).
We present experiments evaluating how prop-
erties of social media arguments interact with au-
dience factors to affect belief change. We com-
pare the effects of two aspects of the ARGUMENT:
whether it is monologic or dialogic, and whether
it is factual or emotional. We also examine how
these factors interact with properties of the AUDI-
ENCE. We profile audience prior beliefs to test if
more neutral people are swayed by different types
of arguments than people with entrenched beliefs.
We also profile the audience for Big Five person-
ality traits to see whether different personality
types are more open to different types of argu-
ments, e.g., we hypothesize that people who are
highly agreeable (A) might be more affected by
the combative style of emotional arguments. We
provide a new corpus for the research community
of audience personality profiles, arguments, and
belief change measurements.1
Audience factors have been explored in so-
cial psychological work on persuasion, but have
been neglected in computational work, which has
largely drawn from sentiment, rhetorical, or argu-
ment structure models (Habernal and Gurevych,
2016b; Conrad et al., 2012; Boltuzic and Sˇnajder,
2014; Choi and Cardie, 2008). We demonstrate
that, indeed, undecided people respond differently
to arguments than entrenched people, and that the
responses of undecided people correlate with per-
sonality. We show that this holds across an array of
different arguments. Our research questions are:
• Can we mine social media to find arguments
that change people’s beliefs?
• Do different argument types have different
effects on belief change?
• Do personality and prior beliefs affect belief
change?
• Are different personality types differently af-
fected by factual vs. emotional arguments?
Our results show a small but highly reliable ef-
fect that short arguments derived from online di-
alogs do lead people to change their minds about
topics such as abortion, gun control, gay marriage,
evolution, the death penalty and climate change.
As expected, opinion change is greater for peo-
ple who are initially more neutral about a topic,
than those who are entrenched. However person-
ality variables also have a clear effect on opin-
ion change: neutral, balanced arguments are more
successful with all personality types, but conscien-
tious people are more convinced by dialogic emo-
tional arguments, and agreeable people are more
persuaded by dialogic factual arguments. We de-
scribe how we use plan these findings to select and
repurpose social media arguments to adapt them to
people’s individual differences and thus maximize
their educational impact.
1nlds.soe.ucsc.edu/persuasion persona
2 Related Work
Previous work on belief change has primarily fo-
cused on single, experimentally crafted, persua-
sive messages, rather than exploring whether user-
generated dialogic arguments can be repurposed
to persuade. Recently however several papers
have begun to investigate two challenges in ar-
gument mining: (1) understanding the structure
of an argument and extracting argument compo-
nents (Lippi and Torroni, 2015; Nguyen and Lit-
man, 2015; Stab and Gurevych, 2014; Lippi and
Torroni, 2015; Biran and Rambow, 2011); and (2)
understanding what predicts the persuasiveness of
web-sourced argumentative content (Habernal and
Gurevych, 2016b; Fang et al., 2016; Wachsmuth et
al., 2016; Habernal and Gurevych, 2016a; Tan et
al., 2016).
Tan et al. (2016) study belief change in the
Reddit /r/ChangeMyView subreddit (CMV), in
which an original poster (OP) challenges others to
change his/her opinion. They build logistic regres-
sion models to predict argument success, identify-
ing two conversational dynamic factors: a) early
potential persuaders are more successful and b) af-
ter 4 exchanges, the chance of persuasion drops
virtually to zero. Linguistic factors of persuasive
posts include: a) dissimilar content words to the
OP, b) similar stop words, c) being lengthy (in
words, sentences, and paragraphs), d) italics and
bullets. Finally, susceptibility to persuasion is cor-
related with singular vs. plural first person pro-
nouns, which the authors relate to the personality
trait of Openness to Experience. The CMV red-
dit offers a unique window into how persuasion of
self-declared open-minded people occurs online.
However, while Tan et al. find potential proxies
for personality traits, they cannot examine traits
directly because they do not have personality pro-
files as we do here. They also do not examine the
effect of argument style as we do.
Recent work (Habernal and Gurevych, 2016b;
Habernal and Gurevych, 2016a) also examines
what makes an informal social media argument
convincing. They have created a new dataset
of pairs of arguments annotated for which argu-
ment is more convincing, along with the reasons
given by annotators for its convincingness. They
test several models for predicting convincingness
comparing an SVM with engineered linguistic fea-
tures to a BLSTM, with both models performing
similarly. In contrast to our experiments, they do
not explore factors of the audience or explicitly
vary the style of the argument.
Previous work also tests the hypothesis that di-
alogic exchanges might be more engaging, in the
context of expository or car sales dialog (Andre´
et al., 2000; Lee, 2010; Craig et al., 2006; Stoy-
anchev and Piwek, 2010). Work comparing mono-
logic vs. dialogic modes of providing information
suggest that dialogs: (1) are more memorable and
engaging, (2) stimulate the audience to formulate
their own questions, and (3) allow audiences to be
more successful at following communication (Lee
et al., 1998; Fox Tree, 1999; Suzuki and Yamada,
2004; Driscoll et al., 2003; Fox Tree and Mayer,
2008; Fox Tree, 1999; Liu and Fox Tree, 2011).
Other work (Vydiswaran et al., 2012) explores
how user-interface factors (e.g., number and or-
der of argument presentation, whether and how
arguments are rated) affect how readers process
arguments. Several factors increased the number
of passages read, including explicitly presenting
contrasting viewpoints simultaneously. This exer-
cise caused people with strong beliefs (about the
healthiness of milk) to moderate their views after
20-30 minutes of concentrated study. We do not
concentrate on interface factors, instead exploring
how persuasiveness relates to audience factors and
argumentative style. Also our experiments are run
online with hundreds of users, rather than as a con-
trolled study in the lab.
3 Experimental Method
Our experimental method consists of the following
steps:
• Select user-generated dialogs with persuasive
argument features from an online corpus of
socio-political debates, exploring the role of
affect (Sec. 3.1).
• Profile subjects for personality traits and
prior beliefs about socio-political issues
(Sec. 3.2).
• Expose subjects to user-generated, factual vs.
emotional dialogic exchanges and compare
the effects on belief change to balanced, cu-
rated arguments (Sec. 3.3).
• Conduct experiments to predict the degree of
belief change as a function of prior belief,
personality and type of argument.
The participants were pre-qualified using a
reading comprehension task that checked their re-
sponses against a gold standard to ensure that they
read the arguments carefully. Because we make
many comparisons, and our experiments are con-
ducted at large scale, all of our results incorporate
Bonferroni corrections.
3.1 Dialog Selection: Identifying
Socio-Emotional Arguments
Our work requires a new experimental corpus
that is sensitive to readers’ prior beliefs and
personalities. We utilize online dialogs from
4forums.com downloaded from The Internet
Argument Corpus (IAC) (Walker et al., 2012c).
The IAC contains quote/response pairs of targeted
arguments between two people (Table 1) on top-
ics such as: death penalty, gay marriage, climate
change, abortion, evolution and gun control. Each
argument is annotated to distinguish arguments
making strong appeals to emotional factors versus
straightforwardly factual arguments.
We selected a subset of extreme exemplars of
factual (FACT) versus emotional (EMOT) argu-
ments, defined as Q/R pairs reliably annotated to
be at the extreme ends of the fact/emotion scale,
i.e. responses with an average ≥ 4 annotation
were considered factual, and those whose anno-
tation averaged ≤ −4 were considered emotional
on a scale of -5 to 5. Table 1 illustrates both fac-
tual (R1) and emotional (R2) arguments, with ad-
ditional examples for other topics in Table 3.
In the IAC, 95% of the Q-R pairs are disagree-
ments, the FACT and EMOT datasets were selected
to contain a similar proportion. There was no
correlation between agreement/disagreement and
emotionality (r = 0.07, ns).
3.2 Personality
Personality is usually measured with a standard-
ized survey that calculates a scalar value for the
five OCEAN traits: opennness to experience O,
conscientiousness C, extraversion E, agreeable-
ness A, and neuroticism N (Goldberg, 1990; Nor-
man, 1963) We first conducted an experiment
to profile the Big Five personality traits of 637
Turkers using the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(TIPI) (Gosling et al., 2003). The TIPI instrument
defines each person on a scale from 1 to 7 with
0.5 precision. In order to guarantee reliablity of
our results, we then verified that our pre-qualified
Turkers are representative of the population as a
whole, by comparing the means and standard de-
viations of our sample of 637 Turkers with the na-
Factual: Abortion
Q3: Not only that, to suggest that untold numbers of
women would seek illegal abortions is a question-
begging claim that has no grounding in history,
logic, or reason. It is an unfounded, unproven
claim. It is a betrayal to sound judgment to make
decisions based upon unfounded predictions into
the future.
R3: But it is based on history. There is plenty of history
showing that women had illegal abortions.
Factual: Climate Change
Q4: This is where the looney left gets lost. Their
mantra is atmospheric CO2 levels are escalating
and this is unquestionably causing earth’s temper-
ature rise. But ask yourself – if global tempera-
tures are experiencing the biggest sustained drop
in decades, while CO2 levels continue to rise –
how can it be true?
R4: Because internal variability from the likes of
ENSO, which can cause short term swings of a full
degree C, easily swamp the smaller increase we’d
expect from CO2 forcing. Easy.
Emotional: Abortion
Q5: Undesired first pregnancy is an acute problem for
many girls who choose to go under the surgical
knife, even though that often ends up with infer-
tility, broken life etc. Dry fasting is an alternative
to first pregnancy abortion. If applied, up to 2-3
months old embryo gets dissolved after 15-16 days
of the fast. Plus, there is no ’christian’ sin.
R5: No Christian sin??? Other then the intent to kill
and then doing so:p
Emotional: Gay Marriage
Q6: Did anyone else expect anything less? These evil
fundie christianists can have affairs, 2, 3, 4, or even
5 marriages yet gay people are a threat to marriage
by wanting to get married.
R6: You hear that cry...allowing gays to marry will
cause the downfall of civilization...but you never
hear ’how’ or ’why’? More Chicken Little ####.
Table 3: Factual vs. Emotional dialog exchanges.
Q = Quote, R = Response.
tional standards given in Gosling et. al (2003). Ta-
ble 4 shows that our survey means and standard
deviations are very close to the national norms,
suggesting our sample is representative of the pub-
lic in general, and hence can be used to validate
whether social media arguments could fruitfully
be be used to educate the public.
E A C N O
Our survey 4.30 5.19 5.50 4.82 5.53
Norms 4.44 5.23 5.4 4.83 5.38
Our survey σ 1.45 1.11 1.32 1.42 1.07
Norms σ 1.44 1.24 1.24 1.41 1.14
Table 4: TIPI σ and mean from our personality
survey compared to the normal distribution
3.3 Prior Beliefs and Belief Change
Previous research suggests that people who are
entrenched about an issue are unlikely to change
their mind (Anderson, 1971; Davies, 1998; Devine
et al., 2000), so we wanted to establish the base-
line beliefs of our pre-qualified Turkers before
they had been exposed to any arguments about a
topic. We therefore collected each Turker’s ini-
tial stance on a topic, by asking them to answer a
simple stance question with no context, for exam-
ple: Should the death penalty be allowed?. Likert
responses were recorded on a -5 to 5 slider scale
with 0.01 degrees of precision, with labels on the
slider of “Yes”, “No”, or “Neutral”.
Curated Summary: Abortion
PRO: Proponents, identifying themselves as pro-choice,
contend that abortion is a right that should not be
limited by governmental or religious authority, and
which outweighs any right claimed for an embryo
or fetus. They argue that pregnant women will re-
sort to unsafe illegal abortions if there is no legal
option.
CON: Opponents, identifying themselves as pro-life, as-
sert that personhood begins at conception, and
therefore abortion is the immoral killing of an in-
nocent human being. They say abortion inflicts
suffering on the unborn child, and that it is unfair
to allow abortion when couples who cannot bio-
logically conceive are waiting to adopt.
Table 5: Traditional balanced summary of
“Should abortion be legal?” from ProCon.org.
Our goal is to compare the belief change that
results from social-media dialogs with the be-
lief change from professionally-curated monologs.
We selected the balanced, monologic, argument
summaries from the website ProCon.org (in
Table 2 with an additional example in Table 5).
The arguments from ProCon.org are very high
quality, and produced by domain experts.
After probing initial beliefs, we presented par-
ticipants with one of the three different argument
types to test their affect on belief change: a Cu-
rated Monolog (MONO) (Table 2), an emotional
argument (EMOT) (R2 in Table 1), or a factual ar-
gument (FACT) (R1 in Table 1). After each per-
son read one of these three types of arguments,
we retested their reactions to the original stance
question, while viewing the argument. Responses
were again recorded on a -5 to 5 slider scale with
0.01 degrees of precision, with labels on the slider
of ”Yes”, ”No”, or ”Neutral”. We computed be-
lief change by measuring differences in stance be-
N Mean change σ change
MONO entrenched 1826 0.50 1.09
MONO neutral 1359 0.62 0.71
FACT entrenched 258 0.27 0.79
FACT neutral 202 0.39 0.55
EMOT entrenched 213 0.35 0.87
EMOT neutral 187 0.37 0.54
ALL entrenched 2951 0.43 1.00
ALL neutral 2234 0.51 0.65
Table 6: Means and σ for belief change for neutral
and entrenched participants presented with MONO,
FACT, or EMOT argument types. Neutrals show
more belief change, and all argument types signif-
icantly affect beliefs
fore and after reading each argument. We created
20 HITs on Mechanical Turk for this task, with 5
items per hit.
4 Experimental Corpus Results
4.1 Entrenchment and Belief Change
Our first question is whether our method changed
participant’s beliefs. Table 6 shows belief
change as a function of argument type: monologs
(MONO), factual (FACT) and emotional (EMOT).
Belief change occurred for all argument types:
and the change was statistically significant as
measured by paired t-tests (t(5184) = 38.31, p
<0.0001). This confirms our hypothesis that so-
cial media can be mined for persuasive materials.
In addition, all three types of arguments indepen-
dently led to significant changes in belief.2
One of the strongest theoretical predictions is
that people with entrenched beliefs about an issue
are less likely to change their mind when provided
new information about that issue. Table 6 shows
the relationship between initial beliefs and extent
of belief change. We defined people as having
more entrenched initial beliefs if their response to
the initial stance question was within 0.5 points of
the two ends of the scale, i.e. (1.0-1.5) or (4.5-5.0),
indicating an extreme initial view.
We tested whether people who were more en-
trenched initially showed less change than those
who were initially more neutral. We conducted
a 2 Initial Belief (Entrenched/Neutral) X 3 Ar-
gument Type (MONO/EMOT/FACT) ANOVA, with
Belief Change as the dependent variable, and Ini-
tial Belief and Argument Type as between subjects
factors. Again, as expected, initially Entrenched
2(For MONO, t(3184) = 32.65, p <0.0001, for FACT,
t(1019) = 14.81, p <0.0001, For EMOT, t(979) = 14.35, p
<0.0001).
people showed less change (M = 0.43) than those
who began with Neutral views (M = 0.51), ANOVA
(F(1,5179)=5.97, p = 0.015).
4.2 Argument Type and Belief Change
We wanted to test whether the engaging, so-
cially interesting, dialogic materials of EMOT and
FACT might promote more belief change than bal-
anced curated monologic summaries. We tested
the differences between argument types, finding
a main effect for argument type (F(2,5179)=31.59,
p <0.0001), with Tukey post-hoc tests showing
MONO led to more belief change than both EMOT
and FACT (both p <0.0001), but no differences
between EMOT and FACT overall across all sub-
jects (See Table 6). Finally there was no inter-
action between Initial Belief and Argument Type
(F(2,5179)=1.25, p >0.05): so although neutrals
show more belief change overall, this susceptibil-
ity does not vary by argument type.
5 Predicting Belief Change
Our results so far show that our arguments
changed people’s beliefs as a function of their
prior beliefs and argument type. However we aim
to automatically predict belief change, and hy-
pothesize that knowing a person’s personality in
combination with their prior beliefs will allow
us to select social-media arguments that are more
persuasive for a particular individual.
Thus, we vary whether providing a learner with
features about a person’s personality improves
performance for predicting belief change, when
compared with providing information about de-
gree of entrenchment alone. We use different rep-
resentations for personality and prior beliefs as
features, the raw score from the Likert slider for
belief change and the TIPI score, as well as nor-
malizations of the raw scores according to the dis-
tributions per topic, and finally categorical binning
of the transformed scores.
5.1 Feature Development and Selection
New features were created by computing the z-
transformation score from the raw prior beliefs
and personality traits scores. Applying Equation 1
to the raw data creates a normal distribution where
the new mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.
For prior beliefs, xi is an individual prior belief
for a particular topic, x¯i is the mean, and σi is the
standard deviation for the particular topic.
xi − x¯i
σxi
(1)
Categorical bins are derived from the trans-
formed scores to describe the direction of the be-
lief change by comparing prior and final recorded
beliefs. The belief change is positive or nega-
tive depending upon where the Turkers rate them-
selves on the belief scale, moving more towards
one side (1) or the other (5). Next, to control for
variance, we apply a z-transformation on change
scores to create a normal distribution. We clas-
sify the resulting distribution into three bins: Low,
Medium, and High. The interpretation of what
stance the Low and High bins represent is strictly
topic dependent. The Medium bin consists of z-
transformation values between -1 and 1. These are
the people whose belief change is less than one
standard deviation from the transformed mean.
The Low bin contains z-transform scores of less
than -1 and translates to belief changes of a large
magnitude (more than a standard deviation from
the mean) in a negative direction, where again, the
meaning of “negative” is dependent upon how the
question was framed. The High bin contains z-
transformation scores of greater than 1 and trans-
lates to belief changes of a large magnitude in a
positive direction. For example, the stance ques-
tion Should the death penalty be allowed?’ has
“no” at the -5 end and “yes” at the +5 end of the
likert scale. A Low bin is indicative as moving in
the direction of the “no” stance and High towards
the “yes” stance.
Bins were also derived for the personality traits,
e.g. for Openness, the High bin indicates someone
who is very open, the Medium bin is average, and
the Low bin is not open at all.
Finally, a binary feature was created to repre-
sent how entrenched an individual is in a particular
topic. This feature is based on the raw prior belief
score and is True if the prior belief score is within
0.5 points of either end point on the stance scale.
This feature is different from the prior belief bins
because this entrenchment feature groups together
people who are in the extremes on both sides of
the stance scale, while the prior belief bins distin-
guishes between the two ends.
We created a development set using data from a
prior Mechanical Turk experiment which had 20
HITs, 5 questions per HIT, and 20 people who
completed each HIT. In the same manner as the
FACT and EMOT HITs, these Turkers (whose per-
sonality was already profiled) were asked about
their prior beliefs about a topic, then presented
with a factual or emotional argument. But in this
case they were asked to rate the strength of the ar-
gument rather than to report their belief about the
topic. We then identified the combination of fea-
tures that best predicted argument strength in this
development data, and then used this feature set
for the belief change experiments below. Turkers
who participated in this initial study did not par-
ticipate in the belief change study and vice versa.
Results on the development set showed that the
z-transformation scores for prior belief and per-
sonality performed better than the raw scores and
bins. On the other hand, the belief change feature
was most effective when represented as a categor-
ical variable via binning and directionality. We
also found that it is better to have both the z-
transformed prior belief feature and the entrench-
ment feature. Thus our experiments below use
these feature representations.
We test on three different datasets: MONO,
FACT and EMOT, to elicit responses from read-
ing the monologic summaries, and the factual and
emotional dialogic arguments. The FACT and
EMOT datasets have specific information in terms
of scalar values about their degree of factuality or
emotionality, on a scale of -5,+5 and a feature with
this value is created for these datasets derived from
the crowdsourced Turker judgments about the de-
gree of Fact/Emotion in a Q/R pair, as described
earlier. The monologic summaries (MONO) are as-
sumed to be neutral and are not assigned a value
for degree of factuality or emotionality.
5.2 Belief Change Experimental Results
Our dataset consists of 5185 items, with 3185 re-
sponses to the balanced MONO summaries, 1020
responses to FACT, and 980 responses to EMOT.
We first applied 10-fold cross-validation with
Naive Bayes, Nearest Neighbor, AdaBoost, and
JRIP, from the Weka toolkit (Hall et al., 2005).
Overall, Naive Bayes had the most consistent
scores with our feature sets, thus we only report
Naive Bayes experimental results below.
Seven feature sets were created for each of the
three {MONO, FACT, EMOT} datasets. None fea-
ture sets are the no-personality baseline within
each dataset. The baseline features contain no
information about the personality of the unseen
human subjects. We use the {MONO, FACT,
EMOT}+None feature sets for testing our hypoth-
esis that personality affects belief change, and our
ability to predict belief change using personality
features. All feature sets have information about
all of the human subjects’ personality traits as 5
distinct features. The remaining five {O,C,E,A,N}
feature sets examine the effect of providing infor-
mation to the learner about personality using only
one personality trait at a time, in order to de-
termine if any personality trait is having a larger
impact for belief change prediction.
Table 7 summarizes our key results, reporting
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 for predicting
belief change as a discrete bin, Low, Medium, and
High. We balanced each dataset to contain the
same number of instances in bins, thus the accu-
racy for majority classification is 33% (Row 1).
After running Naive Bayes over all feature sets
in the three datasets, we compared the experimen-
tal classifier performance of All and {O,C,E,A,N}
against the None baselines using a Bonferroni cor-
rected t-test for F1 measure. Using statistical
ANOVA tests that control for pre and post test sam-
ple variance, we found small but highly reliable ef-
fects. We show all of our results, but focus our dis-
cussion below on statistically significance differ-
ences in F1. We boldface personality feature sets
in Table 7 that are statistically significant when
comparing {MONO, FACT, EMOT}+None with the
other feature sets in the group.
The effect of argument alone (without personal-
ity information) can be seen by the no-personality
baseline for each argument type, where we ex-
clude personality information ({MONO, FACT,
EMOT}+None). All these feature sets perform
above the baseline of 33% (Row 1). This sup-
ports the results of our prior ANOVA testing over
all subjects for belief change, and shows that the
argument itself partially predicts belief change.
However, more interestingly, Table 7 also shows
that providing the learner with information about
personality consistently improves the ability of the
learner to predict belief change. For all types of
arguments, ie. the neutral, monologic summaries
and the factual and emotional dialogs, the feature
sets without any information about the personality
traits of the unseen human subjects perform sig-
nificantly worse than the feature sets that contain
all five personality traits. MONO+None compared
to MONO+All (rows 2 and 8 respectively) show a
slight but significant increase in F1 from 0.51 to
row # Dataset TIPI Accuracy Precision Recall F1
1 Baseline 33%
2 MONO None 57% 0.50 0.58 0.51
3 Open 58% 0.52 0.59 0.52
4 Conscientious 58% 0.51 0.58 0.51
5 Extrovert 58% 0.49 0.57 0.49
6 Agreeable 58% 0.52 0.57 0.50
7 Neurotic 57% 0.49 0.55 0.47
8 All 58% 0.52 0.58 0.52
9 FACT None 49% 0.47 0.47 0.46
10 Open 46% 0.45 0.47 0.46
11 Conscientious 48% 0.48 0.45 0.46
12 Extrovert 48% 0.46 0.45 0.44
13 Agreeable 51% 0.52 0.49 0.49
14 Neurotic 47% 0.45 0.44 0.43
15 All 50% 0.49 0.50 0.49
16 EMOT None 53% 0.42 0.52 0.44
17 Open 56% 0.54 0.53 0.51
18 Conscientious 53% 0.49 0.51 0.48
19 Extrovert 49% 0.43 0.47 0.44
20 Agreeable 52% 0.48 0.50 0.48
21 Neurotic 53% 0.43 0.51 0.44
22 All 56% 0.55 0.57 0.56
Table 7: Predicting Belief Change with Naive Bayes for Three Data Sets: Statistics are based on 10-fold
cross validation. Row numbers provided to reference particular results in the text.
0.52 (using a paired t-test on 10 fold cross vali-
dation scores, (p = .001)). Similarly, FACT+None
versus FACT+All (rows 9 and 15) shows a signifi-
cantly greater increase in F1: from 0.46 to 0.49 (p
= .0002), as does EMOT+None versus EMOT+All
(rows 16 and 22) with F1 increasing from 0.44 to
0.56 (p = .00001). This confirms that the personal-
ity traits improves a model’s ability to predict be-
lief change in unseen human subjects.
Next we compared the effects of providing
the learner with information about each individ-
ual personality feature in isolation by comparing
{MONO, FACT, EMOT}+None with individual per-
sonality factors. For MONO, we found that adding
personality information about Openness to Expe-
rience (MONO+O, row 3) improved F1 from 0.51
to 0.52 compared with a no-personality baseline (p
= .0006). This suggests that open people are more
persuaded by balanced monologic arguments.
A more interesting result is that Openness to
Experience (EMOT+O, row 17) was also impor-
tant for Emotional arguments, increasing F1 from
0.44 to 0.51 (p = .00001). In contrast, Openness
had no effect for Factual arguments (Row 10) (p
> 0.05). Models for predicting belief change for
Emotional arguments also benefit from informa-
tion about Conscientiousness and Agreeableness.
Row 17 (EMOT+O), Row 18 (EMOT+C) and Row
20 (EMOT+A) all show significant differences in
F1, with EMOT+O better than EMOT+None (p =
.00001), EMOT+C better than EMOT+None (p =
.00001) and EMOT+A better than EMOT+None (p
= .0001).
Information about Agreeableness also improves
the quality of the belief change models for the fac-
tual dialogs (FACT+A, row 5) with an increase in
F1 from 0.46 baseline to 0.49 (p = .004), suggest-
ing that people who are more Agreeable are more
influenced by factual arguments. This confirms
one of our initial hypotheses that Agreeable peo-
ple would be more sensitive to the fact/emotional
dimension of arguments because of their desire to
either avoid conflict (highly Agreeable people) or
to seek conflict (Disagreeable people).
6 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to
examine the interaction of social media argument
types with audience factors. Our contributions are:
• A new corpus of personality information and
belief change in socio-political arguments;
• A new method for identifying and deploying
social media content to inform and engage
the public about important social and politi-
cal topics;
• Results showing at scale (hundreds of users)
that we can mine arguments from online dis-
cussions to change people’s beliefs;
• Results showing that different types of ar-
guments have different effects: while bal-
anced monologic summaries led to the great-
est belief change, socio-emotional online ex-
changes also caused changes in belief.
Although our short question/response pairs did
not induce as much belief change as the curated
balanced monologs, we believe that these are strik-
ing results given that the materials we extracted
from online discussions are not balanced or pro-
fessionally produced, but instead are simple frag-
ments extracted from online discussions.
Further, confirming prior work on persuasion
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1975; Kelman, 1961; Petty
et al., 1981), we found that these effects depend
on audience characteristics. As expected, belief
depended on the strength of prior beliefs so that
initially neutral people were more likely to be per-
suaded than entrenched individuals, regardless of
the type of argument. Again supporting our pre-
dictions, argument effectiveness depended on per-
sonality type. People who are Open to Experience
were influenced by balanced and emotional mate-
rials. In contrast, Agreeable people are most af-
fected by factual materials. Emotional arguments
had very different effects from factual and bal-
anced monologs: Openness is important but so too
are Conscientiousness and Agreeableness.
How can we explain this? People who are more
Open are typically receptive to new ideas. But
our results for emotional arguments also show that
Conscientious people change their views when
presented with emotional arguments, possibly be-
cause they are careful to process the arguments
however expressed. And Agreeable people may
also be motivated to change belief by emotional
arguments because they are less likely to be influ-
enced by personal feelings.
Our results have numerous implications that
suggest further technical experimentation. The
fact that we can induce belief change by extract-
ing simple discussion fragments suggests that be-
lief change can be induced without the application
of sophisticated text processing tools. While our
results for balanced monologs suggest that sum-
maries increase belief change, summary tools for
such arguments are still under development (Misra
et al., 2015). However, perhaps high quality sum-
maries may not be needed if compelling argument
fragments can be automatically extracted (Misra et
al., 2016b; Subba and Di Eugenio, 2007; Nguyen
and Litman, 2015; Swanson et al., 2015).
Our work also suggests the importance of per-
sonalization for persuasion: with different person-
ality types being open to different styles of ar-
gument. Future work might be based on meth-
ods for profiling participant personality from sim-
ple online behaviors (Di Eugenio et al., 2013;
Liu et al., 2016; Pan and Zhou, 2014; Yee et
al., 2011), or from user-generated content such as
first-person narratives or conversations (Mairesse
and Walker, 2006a; Mairesse and Walker, 2006b;
Rahimtoroghi et al., 2016; Rahimtoroghi et al.,
2014). We could then select personalized argu-
ments to meet a participant’s processing style.
While here we used crowdsourced judgments to
select arguments of particular types. Elsewhere,
we present algorithms for automatically identify-
ing and bootstrapping arguments with different
properties. We have methods to extract arguments
that represent different stances on an issue (Misra
et al., 2016a; Anand et al., 2011; Sridhar et al.,
2015; Walker et al., 2012a; Walker et al., 2012b),
as well as argument exchanges that are agreements
vs. disagreements (Misra and Walker, 2015), fac-
tual vs. emotional arguments (Oraby et al., 2015),
sarcastic and not-sarcastic arguments, and nasty
vs. nice arguments (Oraby et al., 2016; Lukin and
Walker, 2013; Justo et al., 2014).
An open question is to whether these effects are
long term. Our approach limits us to examining
belief change during a single session for practical
reasons; long-term cross-session comparisons lead
to significant participant retention issues.
Our results also suggest new empirical and the-
oretical methods for studying persuasion at scale.
Only recently have studies of persuasion moved
beyond small scale lab studies involving simple
single arguments (Habernal and Gurevych, 2016b;
Habernal and Gurevych, 2016a; Tan et al., 2016).
Our research also suggests new methods and tools
for larger scale studies of persuasion. While care
must be taken in deploying these results, studies
of juries and other decision making bodies suggest
that exposure to a diversity of opinions and minor-
ity views are very important to countering extrem-
ism and understanding the issues at stake (Devine
et al., 2000; Ludford et al., 2004). The ability
to repurpose the huge number of varied opinions
available in social media sites for educational pur-
poses could provide a novel way to expose people
to a diversity of views.
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